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FUTURE INTERESTS-SEPARATION OF VALID INTERESTS
FROM INTERESTS WHICH ARE VOID BECAUSE OF
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
The problem of the separation of limitations which are valid
under the Rule against Perpetuities from those which are void because of the Rule is suggested in the recent case, Tolman v. Reeve.'
By her will and codicil the testatrix (T) devised homestead property
in trust for her sons, A and B. Upon the death of the sons without
lawful issue or at the death of all of the children before reaching
twenty-one, the homestead was to be given to T's niece and her heirs
in fee simple. If B should die leaving a widow and children, however, they were to occupy the house as long as they desired. Upon
these facts there was a possibility of violation of the Rule against
Perpetuities. That is to say, B, who was unmarried at T's death,
might marry a woman not born at T's death, or if married, his present wife might die and he might still marry a woman unborn at T's
death. In those events the period of time would run beyond lives in
being and twenty-one years, and the devise over could not take
effect. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the devise did not
violate the Rule against Perpetuities for two reasons. First, B's
widow, if any (for B was unmarried at T's death) would not acquire
an estate but only the right to occupy the premises; the fee vested,
therefore, in the niece upon the death of the sons without issue or
with issue who did not reach twenty-one, subject to the right of B's
widow to live on the property. Secondly, the will expressly provided that if any of its provisions should become susceptible of an
interpretation creating an estate of longer duration than is permitted
by law, such provision should be revoked as to the period of time
beyond that fixed by law, and such estate should continue for not
longer than twenty-one years after the death of certain named persons living at the time of T's death. The effect of this provision was
clearly to prevent an unintentional violation of the Rule against
Perpetuities by a revocation of such void parts of the will.
Unfortunately few testators anticipate the operation of the Rule,
and such language of revocation is rare. Where a part of the will
is void because of the Rule, the courts are left to decide whether the
actual intention of the testator will better be given effect by separating valid provisions which take effect within the period allowed by
the Rule from those which are void or by holding the whole disposition void and allowing the estate to go to his heirs-at-law.
The view is stated by Professor Gray: "If future interests
created by any instrument are avoided by the Rule against Perpetui'393 Ill. 272, 65 N. E. 2d 815, 822-823 (1946).
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ties, the prior interests become what they would have been had the
'2
limitation of the future estates been omitted from the instrument.
This doctrine of separation is approved by Professor Leach,' Scott,'
and Simes,' and is the weight of authority.' The principle involved,
as set forth in Liggett v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., is that the
estate progresses to the point at which the Rule begins to operate,
and a fee is given to the person then entitled to take under the statutes of descent and distribution. So, life estates which are valid in
themselves are not destroyed by a remainder which is void for remoteness.'
The rule above mentioned is illustrated by Security Trust Co. V.
Cooling.' In that case the testator gave interests in trust income to
his widow for life; and on the widow's death, he gave it to his two
sons equally for themselves for life. Upon the death of either or both
of the sons, leaving issue, the income was given in further trust to
the issue of each son so dying for life. On the death of the issue
(the grandchildren of the testator), the corpus was to be freed of
trust and to be paid to their issue (the testator's great-grandchildren)
absolutely. In holding the life estates valid, the Court of Chancery
of Delaware said that there may be cases where valid and invalid
provisions cannot be separated, but that the rule is different in the
case of "mere consecutive and successive interests, though contingent, when subsequent remote interests violate the [sic] rule against
perpetuities."'"
The rule stated by Professor Gray seems to be sound. By making
a will the testator has intended that his property should pass in a
certain way. In order to effectuate his intention, so much of the will
should be held valid as it is possible to hold valid.'
Where there is
doubt whether or not the testator would have permitted the valid
provisions to stand, the question should be resolved in favor of their
2 GRAY,

THE RULE AGAINST

PERPETUITIES

(4th ed. 1942)

pp.

260-261.

'Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell (1938) 51 HARV. L. REV. 638,
656-657.
'I SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) secs. 65, 65.1.
2

SIMEs, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS

(1936) secs. 529. 530.

Chenoweth v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 716-718, 6 S. W. 2d 1061,
1069 (1928); McGill v. Trust Company of New Jersey, 94 N. J. Eq.
657, 121 Atl. 760, 766-767 (1923).
'274 Ky. 387, 398, 118 S.W. 2d 720, 725 (1938).
'Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 21 Del. Ch. 102,
180 Atl. 597 (1935); Quinlan v. Wickman, 233 Ill. 39, 84 N. E. 38
(1908); Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W. 2d 984
(1946) ; Lovering v. Worthington, 106 Mass. 86 (1870); In re Lockhart's Estate, 267 Pa. 390, 111 Atl. 254 (1920); Love v. Love,
- S. C. -, 38 S. E. 2d 231 (1946).
"42 A. 2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1945).
" Id. at 789.
" See In re Phelps' Estate, 182 Cal. 752, 190 Pac. 17, 18 (1920);
Burr v. Tierney, 99 Conn. 647, 122 Atl. 454, 457 (1923); Lovering v.
Worthington, 106 Mass. 86, 88 (1870).
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validity. To hold otherwise would amount to indulging in speculation as to his intention and at his expense.'
The view which has been here stated is in harmony with analogous applications of law. For example, the construction of a statute
which will make it constitutional will be adopted rather than the
opposite construction; and the courts will refrain from deciding the
issue of constitutionality until it arises directly." Likewise, in the
law of future interests, a void remainder or executory interest will
not invalidate prior and otherwise valid estates;" and a valid alternative contingency will be given effect at the time when it happens."
So, in a situation just the reverse of the above examples, valid independent limitations following void ones are now held to be valid
in England."
The problem of separability also arises in the case of class gifts.
For example, T leaves his property to his son, A, for life, with a remainder to such of T's grandchildren as reach twenty-five years of
age. When T dies, there is one grandchild, G, who is twenty-five;
but A is still living. In Leake v. Robinson," it was held that the gift
failed altogether; but in that case there was a direction that the
shares of the grandchildren were to be paid when they should reach
twenty-five. The proposal of Professor Leach is that all grandchildren who are twenty-five at the death of T should take their
shares," Especially would this view seem to be correct where there
is no language of futurity in the gift and where survivorship until
twenty-five is not made a condition precedent to vesting in interest.
Suppose, however, that G is not twenty-five at T's death but is only
twenty-four. Professor Simes argues that although G may live one
more year and the class will then close, still G may die before reaching twenty-five. ' Then it may be more than twenty-one years before any other grandchild will reach twenty-five. Where A, the
parent, is living, there is a possibility of there being grandchildren
born after the death of T. The problem is, did T want all of his
grandchildren to share equally, or did he want so much of his win to
For reasoning to this effect, see Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilminton Trust Co., 21 Del. Ch. 102, 180 Atl. 597, 602 (1935). Also
see 2 SIMES, op. cit. supra note 5, sec. 529.
" Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346348 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1931).
"Beall v. Wilson, 146 Ky. 646, 143 S.W. 55 (1912); First Universalist Society v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N. E. 524 (1892); Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray 142 (Mass. 1855).
'Quinlan v. Wickman, 233 111. 39, 84 N. E. 38 (1908); Gray v.
Whittemore, 192 Mass. 367, 78 N. E. 422 (1906); In re Schwamm's
Estate, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 654 (1945).
"In re Coleman, (1936) 1 Ch. 528; In re Canning's Will Trusts,
(1936) 1 Ch. 309.
;2 Merivale 363, 35 Eng. Rep. R. 979 (1817).
"Leach, Rule against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes (1938) 51
HAnv. L. REV. 1329, 1330, 1346-1351.
"2 SIMES, op. cit. supra note 5, sec. 528.
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stand as it is possible to hold to be valid?

In the case of his own

grandchildren, the statutes of descent and distribution will reach a
more desirable result in many cases; but where the grandchildren
are those of another person, all of them who are living at the death
of T should take their shares.
On the other hand the courts of Illinois and Pennsylvania in particular have often shown what Professor Leach calls a "punitive

spirit."' - The rule which is applied there and in a few other jurisdictions to reach such decisions is that where there are valid and
void provisions of an instrument which are so connected together as
to constitute an entire scheme for the disposition of the estate so that
the intention of the testator or maker would be defeated if any portion were stricken, or that manifest injustice would result to the
beneficiaries by such division, then all of the provisions or trusts,
as the case may be, must be construed as a whole.'
Accordingly
the provisions of the will must stand or fall together. This rule does
not appear faulty in itself; and Professor Simes writes that "if it
may reasonably be inferred that the testator would have preferred
to die intestate rather than have his will take effect with the void
clause left out, then the whole will should be held void. '
The real error in Illinois and Pennsylvania has appeared in the
application of the rule to the facts of particular cases. For example,
in Barrett v. Barrett," the testator gave his property in trust for the
payment of income to his widow for life, then to his sons, and afterwards to his grandchildren for life; the corpus of the estate was to be
divided among his great-grandchildren. It was held that the life
estates, although valid under the Rule against Perpetuities, were destroyed, since the testator was presumed to have in mind an entire
scheme for the disposition of his property. The Court said that a
part of the disposition could not be rejected without making a new
will for him; and the courts are powerless to perform that act. A
dictum indicated, however, that provisions or trusts which are independent of each other and valid within themselves may be sustained2 '
The facts of the Barrett case are not essentially different from those
of the-Cooling case cited above. The result of the Barrett case is
clearly wrong because the testator would certainly have wanted his
immediate family to take under his will. If his purpose in creating
the life estates was to prevent his widow or his sons from disposing
of his property unwisely or to safeguard the interests of his great"'Leach, op. cit. supra note 3, at 657.
2-Barrett v. Barrett, 255 Ill. 332, 99 N. E. 625, 628 (1912). In
California, a similar test is laid down: In re Estate of Whitney, 176
Cal. 12, 19, 167 Pac. 399, 402 (1917).
2
2 SnMES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 405, sec 529. In Kentucky,
where life estates are generally held to be valid, the rule is stated.
Ford v. Yost, 300 Ky. 764, 766-767, 190 S.W. 2d 21, 22-23 (1945).
S255 Ill. 332, 99 N. E. 625 (1912).
Id. at 3, 99 N. E. 625 at 628.
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grandchildren, the life estates should still have been upheld.* They
would bring the property two steps closer to them (by preventing
the alienation of the property for the period of the life estates), and
then in all probability their parents would provide for them. If not,
the great-grandchildren would take from their parents under an
intestacy. The Barrett case is a striking example of punishing the
testator for making a will which violates the Rule against Perpetuities.
In Pennsylvania, some of the cases have reached the same result as the former case. In Geissler v. Reading Trust Co.," the facts
were similar to those of the Cooling case; but all of the interests
were held to fail. (There was a devise in trust which provided for
the payment of income to the testator's children for life and then to
the grandchildren for life, with a remainder to the great-grandchildren.) In Ledwith v. Hurst; also, life interests were given to
the testator's wife and daughter, to his grandchildren, and to the
daughter's descendants without limit. When the prior life interests
were terminated, the estate was to be given to charities in fee. The
Court held that the prior gifts were void and that the gift over,
being a perpetuity, was invalid. Thus the life tenants might have
taken life estates under the will, and their heirs-at-law would have
taken the remainder by inheritance. However, the prior interests
failed. The result would not have differed if the prior interests
had been sustained save that the identity of the ultimate heirs would
be determinable only after the death of the life tenants. The latter
decision does not necessarily further the intention of the testator
because the life estates might have continued ad infinitum to the
descendants of the daughter if it were not for the Rule against
Perpetuities. The gift to the charities appears to have been the incidental part of the will. In both of these Pennsylvania cases, the
prior estates might well have been held valid.
Several cases in Illinois and Pennsylvania have held the prior
interests to be valid. Nevitt v. Woodburne (Illinois) and In re
Whitman's Estate" (Pennsylvania) and other cases have practically
the same facts as Barrett v. Barrett, Geissler v. Reading Trust Co.,
and Ledwith v. Hurst; but the holdings are exactly the opposite." The
By the fact that the testator provides for life estates, it may
be said that he would rather have his family or others take life estates than immediate fees under the statutes of descent and distribution. The argument for this view is presented in Note (1925) 38
HARV. L. REv. 379, 383.
' 257 Pa. 329, 101 Atl. 797 (1917).
Accord: In Te Kountz's Estate, 213 Pa. 390, 62 AtI. 1103 (1906).
'284 Pa. 94, 130 Atl. 315 (1925).
-"190 Ill. 283, 60 N. E. 500 (1901).
248 Pa. 285, 93 Atl. 1062 (1915).
"In fact, Nevitt v. Woodburn is a much stronger case than the
Cooling case, for instance. In the former case, the limitqtion over
was not given to the testator's own grandchildren or great-grand-
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two former cases which separate valid and void provisions of an
instrument and allow prior valid interests to take effect afford a
sound basis for future decisions in those two states.
The principle which is so often applied, namely, the principle
that the testator has intended a general scheme of disposition, even
though such intent is not evident, seems to be correctly applied in
cases of a different kind. It is believed that there ate cases where
valid and invalid interests should not be separated where a strange
result would be reached by so doing. For example, in Benedict v.
Webb,' the testator left his estate in trust for the payment of income to his widow for life and to his children until the youngest
should reach twenty-one years of age. Two-thirds of the principal
was then to be divided among his children in the following manner:
the shares of the two sons were to be paid to them at once, and the
shares of the daughters were to be held in trust for the payment of
income to them for life. Further, on the death of any daughter, her
share was to go to her issue. Because of the New York statute prohibiting suspension for more than two lives, the Court of Appeals
held that as to one of the daughters who was of age the gift was
void. The reason was that the minorities of her brother and sisters
caused a suspension for two lives until they reached their respective
majorities. Until that time, her life was a third one. It was presumed that if the testator had known that one of his children could
not receive her share, he would have made a different disposition of
his property, because his will evidenced the same regard for all of his
children.
In Reid v. Voorhees, - the testator's personal property was given
to the children'of his sister, and his real property was given to his
brothe'sichildken after the termination of a thirty year period during
which the income from rents was to be paid to all of the nephews and
nieces. The whole limitation was correctly held to be invalid because in the opinion of the Court the testator meant to treat similarly
all of his nephews and nieces. In the Reid. case, the testator had no
children; and the statute of descent and distribution reached a more
desirable result, since his nephews and nieces took equally as his
heirs-at-law.,-'In- those cases it can be said that the reasonable inference is that the testator would have "preferred to die intestate
raffier' than to. iave had only a part of the devisees take his
property.
:" Ii Joncliision it is submitted that where the later rovisions of an
instrument violate the Rule against Perpetuities, 'the valid precedffig
part shu#'stand and all interests *should take effect u to the point
children, but was given to collateral kindred. In the Note (1925) 38
HARv. L. REv. 379, 383, it is stated that there is a weaker case for
separability where the void gift over is to strangers. Yet the Illinois
court,corre5tly held prior life estates to be valid in that case.
3f128

N Y. 466'(1885).

-HGlkI',236, 74-N. E. 804 (1905).
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where the Rule begins to operate. Yet if there is a reasonable inference that the testator intended to create a general scheme of disposition, or if an unintended inequality would result from sustaining
the earlier and otherwise valid interests created, all of the provisions
should fall together, the result being that the estate would pass under
the statutes of descent and distribution. Attorneys and draughtsmen
should keep in mind the case of Tolman v. Reeve, since it counteracts
the argument that if the testator had known of the Rule against Perpetuities, he would have made a measurably different will. If he
expressly provides that no limitation should violate the Rule against
Perpetuities, it cannot possibly be said that the courts are violating
his intention by validating so much of the will as meets the test of
the Rule. The insertion of such a provision would save much litigation and would come very close to effectuating the true intention of
the testator in practically every case.
ELMER DURWARD WELDON

